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Abstract 
Turkey has decided to harmonize its tarification structure with that of the European 
Union. For the country’s authorities, this move to a Customs Union is only meant to be the 
first step toward integration in the European Union. There are signs, however, that political 
opposition to the government’s procompetitive stance may be strong enough to block any 
further move toward fuller trade liberalization. We show, using applied intertemporal GE 
analysis, that to be welfare improving, the trade reform would have to be pursued further 
and nontariff barriers on European trade removed. Failure to do so could be more 
detrimental to domestic welfare than no reform at all. 0 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
JEL classi$cation: C68; D58; F12; F13; F15; F17; 052 
Keywords: Dynamic applied general equilibrium; Imperfect competition; Turkey; Customs union 
1. Introduction 
Turkey (TR) has long held aspirations of becoming a full member of the former 
European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union (EU). Despite 
the rejection of its official re-application for full membership in April 1987, TR 
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pursued unilaterally its trade liberalization efforts vis-a-vis the EEC by substan- 
tially reducing its sectoral tariffs on its European imports. In March 1995, TR 
decided to harmonize its tariffication structure with that of the EU in a ‘Customs 
Union’ (CU) which has been put into effect in January, 1996. 
For the Turkish authorities today, this move to a CU is only meant to be the 
first step toward the country’s integration in the EU. The next phase will require 
complying with the European Single Market rules, i.e., full integration of the 
commodity markets. ’ As one expects, such a pro-competitive policy does not 
generate unanimous support in the country. Lobby groups are actively working to 
mobilize various elements of opposition to bring the pro-competitive effort to a 
stop. The outcome of this political game is of course hard to predict, but it seems 
unlikely that the opposition parties will manage to force a complete policy reversal 
in the immediate future. Hence, a likely compromise could be as follows: the CU 
is history in the making and therefore a fact, but achievement of the second phase 
of the trade reform program has to be postponed if not altogether dropped from the 
agenda. 
It is our objective in this paper to shed some light on the desirability, for TR, of 
such a status quo. For this purpose, we use an applied intertemporal general 
equilibrium (GE) model of trade and production which recognizes increasing 
returns to scale technologies in some sectors, existence of firm level product 
differentiation, and oligopolistic market structures. ’ Our findings suggest strong 
negative welfare effects from the CU with Europe, because of the initially heavily 
distorted nature of the Turkish economy. In contrast, the second phase of the trade 
reform is projected to yield substantial gains for the domestic economy, though the 
cumulative gains remain rather modest. Our conclusion is therefore clear: from the 
point of view of TR, simple harmonization of the tariff system - the CU - can 
only be regarded as an interim phase which has to be complemented with further 
steps toward full market integration with the EU. A political compromise that 
would result in a CU status quo appears to be the worst possible option with likely 
negative welfare consequences for the country. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the main features of 
our GE model, and makes precise our measure of welfare. The policy scenarios 
are presented in Section 3 together with a discussion of the main mechanisms at 
work based on partial equilibrium arguments. In Section 4, we discuss the policy 
results, and we conclude in Section 5. 
’ Ultimately, monetary and labor market integration will have to be achieved if TR is to become a 
full member of the EU. This third phase will not be achieved in the near future for both economical and 
political reasons. We therefore disregard this policy option. 
* Previous applied GE analyses of the Turkish economy are static: e.g., Celasun (1986). Yeldan 
(1989). Harrison et al. (1993). 
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2. The model 3 
Turkey (TR) is part of a world economy consisting of itself and six other 
regions (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the rest of the EU, and the rest of 
the world.) Each country has nine sectors of production, of which four are 
perfectly competitive. 4 In these sectors, countries are linked by an Armington 
system so that commodities are differentiated in demand by their geographical 
origin. The other five industries are modeled as noncompetitive. 5 In the latter 
sectors, firms are assumed to be symmetric within national boundaries. They 
operate with fixed primary factor costs and therefore face increasing returns to 
scale in production. They have no monopsony power. Each individual oligopolist 
produces a different good. Industry structure is assumed fixed in the short run; 
oligopolistic firms may then experience non-zero profits. In the long run, however, 
entry and exit of competitors in a Chamberlinian fashion ensure that these rents 
vanish. The competitive game between oligopolistic firms is assumed to be static 
Coumot-Nash. The instantaneous GE concept adopted is a compromise in terms 
of informational requirements between the primitive conjectural Cournot-Nash- 
W&as equilibrium of Negishi and the objective Coumot-Nash-Walras equilib- 
rium introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial. 6 In all sectors, competitive and 
noncompetitive, a detailed country- and sector-specific system of price-responsive 
intermediate demands is specified that recognizes differences among products 
from individual oligopolistic suppliers a la Ethier. 
Final demand decisions are made in each country by a single representative 
household that is competitive, infinitely lived, and utility-maximizing. The domes- 
tic household owns all the country’s primary factors, namely, labor and physical 
capital, which it rents to domestic firms only, at the same competitive price 
regardless of the sector. ’ In the short run, however, total returns to capital may 
differ across industries: oligopolistic profits may add to capital rental earnings 
because of unexpected shocks. We abstract from leisure/labor decisions and 
population growth so that the variables under household control are consumption 
3 The data are discussed in Mercenier (1995a), Mercenier and Yeldan (1996) and Kose and Yeldan 
(1996). See Mercenier and Yeldan (1996) for a formal description of the model, of the calibration and 
solution procedures. 
4 The four perfectly competitive sectors are agriculture and primary products; food, beverage, and 
tobacco; other manufacturing industries (textile, wood, paper, metallurgy and minerals); and transport 
and services. 
5 The noncompetitive industries are pharmaceutical products; chemistry other than pharmaceutical 
products; motor vehicles; office machinery; and other machinery and transport materials. 
6 Noncompetitive firms neglect the feedback effect of their decisions on their profits via income (the 
Ford effect) and via input-output multipliers (the Nikaido effect). 
’ The risk of multiple equilibria highlighted by Mercenier (1995b) is reduced by the assumption that 
physical factors are internationally immobile. 
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and investment. In making optimal decisions subject to their intertemporal budget 
constraints, households can borrow or lend on international markets. All final 
demands recognize differences among products from individual oligopolistic firms 
a la Dixit and Stiglitz. 
The only explicit role of the government is to raise tariffs, the proceeds of 
which are rebated to domestic consumers lump-sum. National markets are as- 
sumed to be segmented in the initial equilibrium: because of nontariff barriers 
(NTBs) that prevent customers from cross-border arbitraging, noncompetitive 
firms behave as price-discriminating oligopolists. 
The model is calibrated on base year data assuming the world economy in 
steady state. For the computation of the transitional dynamics, we make use of 
recent results by Mercenier and Michel(1994) on temporal aggregation: the model 
is solved on a horizon of 35 years using five unequally distant grid dates: t, = 1, 
t, = 5, t, = 10, t, = 20, and t4 = 35. 
Central to our analysis is the measure of welfare gains. Let e(ct> be the 
reference stream of consumption and C(t) be the corresponding time profile 
computed after implementation at t = 0 of a once and for all previously unex- 
pected trade policy change. The welfare gain is determined from the following 
utility indifference condition: 
that is, the welfare gain resulting from the policy change is equivalent from the 
perspective of the representative Turkish household to increasing the reference 
consumption profile by $ percent. 
3. Description of the experiments 
3.1. The benchmark 
Nominally at least, the European Single Market has been completed since 
January 1993. In practice, of course, the program will take some time to become 
fully implemented and indeed longer still before its effects can be observed in the 
data. We therefore generate as an initial simulation the new international environ- 
ment in, which Turkey has to make its future policy decisions, i.e., we compute the 
post-Europe ‘92 equilibrium. This equilibrium serves as the benchmark for our 
following policy simulations. 
3.2. The trade policy experiments 
In our first experiment, we implement the Turkish commitment to enter a CU 
with the EU. Technically, this consists to set most tariffs on European imports to 
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zero and to harmonize most rates on imports from the ROW with the existing 
European rates. 
In the second experiment, TR is assumed to join the European Single Market. 
(See, among others, Smith and Venables, 1988, and Mercenier, 1995a.j This 
implies that, in addition to tariff harmonization, both the Turkish and the European 
firms switch from their initial price-discriminating strategy to a single-pricing 
behavior within the Extended EU (henceforth: EEU = EU + TR). Formally, let 
u,,, be the marginal production cost of a firm operating in sector s of country i; 
zi,s,j and Pi.s,j respectively the amount sold and the price charged by the same 
firm on market j. The optimal pricing strategy of the firm is determined from 
Pi,s,TR - ‘i,s 
h 
a log Pi,s,TR 
+(1-A) 
a log Pi,s,EEU 
= 
Pi,s.TR 
with h = 1 in the calibration. The experiment consists to set A = 0 with the 
elasticity on the right is evaluated using the EEU-aggregated demand. The 
rationale behind this experiment is as follows. NTBs confer to firms (domestic and 
foreign) the power to price discriminate between TR and other markets. Full 
integration of TR in the EU involves suppressing all forms of NTBs. This should 
restore cross-border arbitraging and force firms to charge a unique price within the 
EEU. Because NTBs are essentially unobservable, we treat them as latent vari- 
ables, and generate the effects of their elimination by forcing the individual firms 
to adopt single pricing within the (now extended) European market on the basis of 
their average EEU-wide monopoly power. 
What can TR expect from such a trade integration experiment in terms of 
welfare? Turkish firms are thought, initially, to charge higher prices in their 
domestic market, in which they usually hold the largest share. A move to a 
single-price strategy within the EEU would, therefore, induce a reduction of prices 
charged by those firms on the home market (see Table 1 for the calibrated price 
spread for chemicals). The conjecture is that consumer prices will decline relative 
to factor prices and that Turkish households will be better off. In addition, in the 
long run, a rationalization effect a la Harris could result from adjustments in 
industry structure. Indeed, the new pricing rule could reduce industry profits, 
induce exit so that a smaller number of surviving firms would operate on a larger 
scale with lower average costs. The positive outcome for the consumer of this 
structural adjustment could, however, be offset by two companion effects. Exit of 
firms from an industry reduces product diversity which has a direct welfare cost, 
since consumers love variety (the Dixit and Stiglitz specification). Furthermore, 
diversity in available intermediate goods affects production efficiency in all 
sectors: everything else equal, exit of firms in an industry increases variable unit 
costs in all other sectors, competitive and noncompetitive (the Ethier specification). 
Our aim here is to measure these effects and analyze how they combine to affect 
the level and pattern - intertemporal and intersectoral - of welfare, production, 
and employment. 
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Table 1 
Selected results for the Turkish chemicals industry 
Calibrated spread of prices to: GB 0.869 
D 0.869 
F 0.869 
I 0.869 
Rest of EU 0.869 
TR 1.010 
ROW 0.869 
On impact (first year) On steady state 
Effects of customs union with EU (% changes w.r.to base case) 
Average selling price lj - 12.7 
Variable unit cost u - 10.3 
Wage rate W -7.7 
Rental price of capital r -7.7 
Average cost V -8.1 
Output scale (per firm) Q -4.6 
Number of firms n 0.0 
Efficiency gains -4.4 
- 11.1 
- 10.5 
- 9.0 
- 11.2 
-11.1 
1.8 
-28.7 
2.0 
Full commodity market integration with EU (% changes w.r. to post customs union equilibrium) 
Average selling price P -4.8 -6.5 
Variable unit cost ” 0.1 - 0.6 
Wage rate W 2.2 1.9 
Rental price of capital r 2.5 0.4 
Average cost V - 3.8 -6.5 
Output scale (per firm) Q 17.4 30.8 
Number of firms n 0.0 -0.9 
Efficiency gains 14.7 25.1 
3.3. Highlight of the basic mechanisms at work 
Systematic sectoral patterns are, of course, not to be expected because of GE 
effects. One may nevertheless trace the type of adjustments that take place using 
selected sectoral variables and partial equilibrium arguments. For this purpose, we 
give in Table 1 some results for TR’s chemical industry. The first part of the table 
illustrates the importance of market segmentation in the calibrated equilibrium: 
Turkish firms in this industry clearly charge higher prices on the domestic market. 
The second part of the table reports on the effects of TR’s forming a CU with 
the EU. Numbers are percentage deviations from the benchmark. For clarity, we 
only report results for the first year following the policy implementation and for 
the steady state. As Turkish customers substitute in favor of foreign goods, 
domestic prices are forced downward in all sectors which induces a fall in factor 
prices (w and r). Variable unit costs u therefore unambiguously fall in all sectors, 
as well as total fixed costs in those industries that are noncompetitive. In the 
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domestic market, foreign penetration erodes the monopoly power previously 
enjoyed by local producers in the chemical industry: the firm’s average selling 
price fi falls by 12.7%. Note that in this industry, the drop in p unambiguously 
exceeds the cost saving effect of the trade liberalization (average costs V decline 
by 8.1%) so that, even if the production scale were to remain unchanged, the firm 
would experience negative profits. The situation is actually worse: because of a 
combination of substitution and income effects, the firm is forced up along its 
average cost curve since the volume of its sales Q declines by 4.6%. The average 
scale in the Turkish chemical industry is unambiguously too small for all existing 
firms to survive. More than a quarter of the firms will be forced out of the market 
(28.7%), hence making it possible for survivors to operate more efficiently, i.e., on 
a larger scale (1.8%) with lower total unit costs (11.1%). The long-term efficiency 
gains (i.e., the real cost savings due to increased scale on initial output) achieved 
in the sector because of this industry-rationalization mechanism amounts to 
approximately 2.0%. 
In the third part of Table 1, we report on the effects of TR’s joining the 
European Single Market. All numbers are percentage deviations from the post-CU 
equilibrium. The adoption of the single-price rule within the EEU results in lower 
prices for domestic consumers and lower average selling prices for local producers 
of chemical products in the short run ( - 4.8%). This boosts demand up by 17.4%. 
At the aggregate level, the same mechanism operates resulting in increased 
competition for resources (short-term wages and capital rentals increase by 
approximately 2%) but generally with lower prices in noncompetitive industries. 
As a result, the variable unit costs in Turkish chemicals are essentially unchanged 
( + 0.1%). Though total fixed costs have also increased, unit production costs have 
been reduced by 3.8% since the firms now operate at larger scale. The achieved 
gains in efficiency (14.7%) are, however, not large enough to prevent existing 
firms from experiencing negative profits and some producers will be forced out of 
that industry. The necessary long-term change in industry concentration turns out 
to be quite modest ( - 0.9%) thanks to growth effects which will be documented in 
the next section. 
4. Is a customs union with Europe enough? 
We now turn to GE effects and concentrate our attention on major aggregate 
variables. In all calculations, we use a discount rate of 7%. The first part of Table 
2 reports the computed effects of the CU currently under implementation. The 
tariff reform induces a strong deterioration of the terms of trade. The wealth 
contraction shifts the time profile of consumption downward. Investment increases 
over the whole time horizon, however, despite the negative wealth shock. This is 
because the new time structure of prices make it optimal for consumers to 
substitute future for current consumption. Hence, production capacities increase 
though not monotonously: the capital stock overshoots its new steady-state level 
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Table 2 
Dynamic GE effects of trade liberalization scenarios for Turkey 
Years 1 5 10 20 35 
a: Customs union with EU (% changes from benchmarch) (Welfare (4) = - 0.832) 
Consumption - 1.82 - 1.12 -0.53 - 0.27 
Investment 6.42 4.51 1.61 0.30 
Capital 0.00 1.32 1.99 1.86 
Efficiency gains - 4.95 - 2.78 ~ 1.12 0.71 
Wage rate - 7.71 -7.82 - 8.16 - 8.53 
Rental price of capital -7.74 -9.30 - 10.40 -11.04 
Price indexes of: 
- consumption - 9.35 - 10.00 - 10.52 - 10.75 
- investment - 10.06 - 10.63 - 11.08 - 11.26 
Terms of trade - 9.02 - 9.69 - 10.21 - 10.48 
b: Full commodity market integration with EU (% Changes from customs union) 
(Welfare (4) = + 0.897) 
Consumption 0.28 0.69 1.05 1.23 
Investment 4.50 3.79 2.33 1.92 
Capital 0.00 0.92 1.51 1.85 
Efficiency gains 12.36 13.22 14.03 15.55 
Wage rate 2.25 2.25 2.14 2.05 
Rental price of capital 2.52 1.63 0.97 0.58 
Price indexes of: 
- consumption 1.24 0.85 0.53 0.36 
- investment 1.17 0.84 0.54 0.40 
Terms of trade 1.38 1.02 0.72 0.57 
- 0.34 
0.90 
0.90 
2.88 
- 8.98 
- 11.24 
- 10.68 
- 11.21 
- 10.49 
1.28 
1.89 
1.89 
18.40 
1.94 
0.39 
0.32 
0.37 
0.56 
during the transition. As a result, the long-term supply of capital services only 
mildly increases, by less than 1%. Important intersectoral adjustments take place 
simultaneously. In particular, rationalization of imperfectly competitive industries 
improve the competitiveness of the country’s industrial sector, generating long-term 
aggregate efficiency gains (i.e., real cost savings due to increased scale on initial 
output) of almost 3%. However, the policy’s overall positive impact on steady-state 
factor supply and efficiency is too modest to compensate for the terms of trade 
loss: the welfare cost amounts to a sacrifice of real consumption on the whole time 
horizon of almost 1% (4 = -0.832%). The results clearly suggest that a partial 
trade liberalization policy, limited to the tariff harmonization reform as currently 
under implementation, is undesirable. 
If Turkey were to join the European Single Market, it would have to get rid not 
only of tariffs but also of all forms of NTBs. The elimination of NTBs shifts up 
the time path of consumption, but only mildly affects the time profile of aggregate 
variables. The second part of Table 2 confirms that the overall impact on the 
economy is quite substantial. The reason is to be found in sectors of activity 
initially dominated by inefficient local oligopolists. The opening up of domestic 
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markets to international competition forces Turkish producers to cut prices in the 
domestic market and to move down along their average cost curve to face the 
induced expansion of demand. The efficiency gains hence achieved by the 
second-phase reform vary between 12 and 19% (depending on the position on the 
time axis). The cost-saving shock has a positive wealth effect which is responsible 
for the upward shift of the consumption profile. It also boosts up capital accumula- 
tion with an expansion of steady-state capacities close to 2%. Domestic consumers 
are clearly made better-off under this extended policy reform: real consumption 
has unambiguously increased on the whole time horizon. More formally, to be 
indifferent between this and the previous equilibrium allocations, Turkish house- 
holds would have to be compensated in the latter case by an amount equivalent to 
almost one percent of their consumption flows over the whole time horizon 
(4 = +0.897%). Observe from the cumulated equivalent variation, that the wel- 
fare effect for TR of full trade integration with the EU is positive. 
What we learn from these numbers is plain: a partial trade reform in the form of 
a tariff harmonization with Europe is undesirable if it is not complemented by a 
systematic elimination of all forms of NTBs that shield domestic oligopolists from 
foreign competition at the expense of local customers. 
5. Conclusion 
For both political and economical reasons, TR has met strong resistance to its 
long held aspiration of becoming a full member of the European bloc. Despite this, 
and presumably as a demonstration of commitment to this aspiration, the Turkish 
authorities have completed the adjustment process as outlined in the 1963 Ankara 
Agreement, and in 1996 unilaterally undertook a trade reform by harmonizing the 
country’s tariff structure to that of the EU. The resulting Customs Union is 
regarded as a temporary first step toward full commodity-trade integration within 
the unified European market. 
There are signs, however, that political opposition to the government’s pro 
competitive stance may be strong enough to bloc any further move toward fuller 
trade liberalization. We have shown in this paper that such a status quo should not 
be considered ‘an acceptable compromise’. According to our evaluations using 
applied intertemporal GE analysis, the Turkish households would be impoverished 
by a partial trade reform. In other words, to be welfare improving, the trade reform 
would have to be pursued further and nontariff barriers on European trade 
removed. Failure to do so could be more detrimental to domestic welfare than no 
reform at all. 
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